I offer a line of argument that aims at the conclusion that the notion of radically different and incommensurable systems of value is incoherent, which would mean that the presumption of some significant common ground of valuation is rationally required in value inquiry.

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: [W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions ... are needed. I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More pre-cisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational (...) truth-predicate; that the word true, in ordinary language, is not a disquotational truth-predicate; and that it is not at all clear that it is even possible to introduce a disquotational truth-predicate into ordinary language. If so, then we have no clear sense how it is even possible to be a methodological deflationist. My goal here is not to convince a committed deflationist to abandon his or her position. My goal, rather, is to argue, contrary to what many seem to think, that reflection on the apparently trivial character of T-sentences should not incline us to deflationism. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the idea that Pentecostalism is best supported by conjoining it to a postmodern, narrative epistemology in which everything is a text requiring interpretation. On this view, truth doesn’t consist in a set of uninterpreted facts that make the claims of Christianity true; rather, as James K. A. Smith says, truth emerges when there is a “fit” or proportionality between the Christian story and one’s affective and emotional life. We argue that Pentecostals should reject this account (...) of truth, since it leads to either a self-refuting story-relativism or the equally problematic fallacy of story-ism: favoring one’s own story over others without legitimate reason. In either case, we contend, the gospel itself is placed at risk. (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to show that if Plantinga’s free will defence succeeds, his O Felix Culpa theodicy fails. For if every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity, then given that Jesus has a creaturely essence (as we attempt to show), it follows that Incarnation and Atonement worlds cannot be actualized by God, in which case we have anything but a felix culpa.

In this paper we respond to three objections raised by Joshua Harris to our article, “Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology,” in which we express misgivings about the conjunction of Pentecostalism with James K. A. Smith’s postmodern, story-based epistemolo- gy. According to Harris, our critique: 1) problematically assumes a correspondence theory of truth, 2) invalidly concludes that “Derrida’s Axiom” conflicts with “Peter’s Axiom,” and 3) fails to consider an alternative account of the universality of Christian truth claims. We argue that Harris’s (...) objections either demonstrate a deficient interpretation of the relevant biblical pas- sages or are not directed at us at all. (shrink)

C. Stephen Layman contends that an argument supporting theism over naturalism can be constructed based on three defensible, non–question-begging premises about the moral order. Previous critics of Layman’s argument have challenged the truth of these premises. We stipulate them arguendo but go on to show that there is a deeper problem: a fourth premise introduced to complete the argument—the “completion premise,” as we call it—is true only if we assume that God exists or we concede that there is no afterlife. (...) We close with suggestions for how Layman’s argument must be strengthened to meet with dialectical success. (shrink)

In this chapter, we attempt to show that J.P. Moreland's understanding of apologetics is beautifully positioned to counter resistance to a rationally defensible Christianity—resistance arising from the mistaken idea that any rational defense will fail to support or even undermine relationship. We look first at Paul Moser's complaint that since rational apologetics doesn’t prove the God of Christianity, it falls short of delivering what matters most—a personal agent worthy of worship and relationship. We then consider John Wilkinson's charge that the (...) use of reason and argument in evangelistic contexts is relationally futile. Since people aren’t looking for arguments, and logic is an arbitrary human invention, we should present Christianity to others as an irrational faith story. (shrink)

Most models of generational succession in sexually reproducing populations necessarily move back and forth between genic and genotypic spaces. We show that transitions between and within these spaces are usually hidden by unstated assumptions about processes in these spaces. We also examine a widely endorsed claim regarding the mathematical equivalence of kin-, group-, individual-, and allelic-selection models made by Lee Dugatkin and Kern Reeve. We show that the claimed mathematical equivalence of the models does not hold. *Received January 2007; revised (...) April 2008. †To contact the authors, please write to: Elisabeth Lloyd, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 130 Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405; e-mail: [email protected]; Richard Lewontin, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 26 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; Marcus Feldman, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

This study is a phenomenological inquiry into several relatively unexplored phenomena, including certain key methodological issues. It seeks to elicit and explicate the grounds of free-fantasy variation, which Husserl insists contains his “fundamental methodological insight” since it articulates “the fundamental form of all particular transcendental methods…” In the course of pursuing the full sense of this method and its grounds, the essay also uncovers the origins and eventual presence of “self” and explores the multiple connections among self, mental life, embodiment (...) and the surrounding world. To that end, it is necessary to take seriously Husserl’s otherwise odd declaration that “‘feigning’ [‘Fiktion’] makes up the vital element of phenomenology as of every other eidetic science…”, and thus that every philosopher must “fertilize” his or her “fantasy” through works of art and history as well as other areas and practices of human life. The essay offers an in-depth probing of several striking but largely unexplored phenomena: exemplifying and possibilizing, and concludes with an exploration of one of the most pervasive themes in phenomenological inquiry: intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing circuits work, but it has problems explaining experiences this way. For example, it hasn’t explained how colour and shape circuits bind together in visual processing, nor why colours and other qualia are experienced so differently yet processed by circuits so similarly, nor how to get from processing circuits to pictorial images spread across inner space. Some theorists turn from these circuits to their electromagnetic fields to deal with such difficulties concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, privacy, (...) and causality. They include Kohler, Libet, Popper, Lindahl, Arhem, Charman, Pockett, John, McFadden, Fingelkurts, Maxwell, and Jones. They’re classifiable as computationalist, reductionist, dualist, realist, interactionist, epiphenomenalist, globalist, and localist. However, they’ve never been analysed together as a whole, which hinders evaluations of them. This article tries to rectify this. It concludes that while field theories face challenges, they aren’t easily dismissed, for they draw on considerable evidence and may avoid serious problems in neuroscience concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, causality, and ontology. (shrink)

Life is a battlefield onto which we are thrown at birth, with only fate and fortune settling upon where we land. Wherever we land, whether it's on the front lines or surrounded by a network of defenses, we are all asking the same question: why are we here? The problem with this question, however, is that we tend to answer it from our own relative positions, and so we all arrive at different conclusions. The many answers we've created have filled (...) the field. They have become banners that are raised high so that we can see and follow them. These banners are always at risk of being toppled though; always at risk of losing their capacity for belief. But then, what if belief is more than a mere by-product of our universal search? What if belief can change the very fabric of this field? That is, what if truth is actually irrelevant, and the only real thing that makes up this battlefield is the belief, and consequently the collective will, which we invest in our answers? (shrink)

Although Kurt Gödel does not figure prominently in the history of computabilty theory, he exerted a significant influence on some of the founders of the field, both through his published work and through personal interaction. In particular, Gödel’s 1931 paper on incompleteness and the methods developed therein were important for the early development of recursive function theory and the lambda calculus at the hands of Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Church and his students studied Gödel 1931, and Gödel taught a (...) seminar at Princeton in 1934. Seen in the historical context, Gödel was an important catalyst for the emergence of computability theory in the mid 1930s. (shrink)

Physics has been slowly and reluctantly beginning to address the role and fundamental basis of the ‘observer’ which has until now also been considered metaphysical and beyond the mandate empirical rigor. It is suggested that the fundamental premise of the currently dominant view of ‘Cognitive Theory’ - “Mind Equals Brain” is erroneous; and the associated belief that the ‘Planck scale, ‘the so-called basement level of reality’, as an appropriate arena from which to model psycho-physical bridging is also in error. In (...) this paper we delineate a simple, inexpensive experimental design to ‘crack the so-called cosmic egg’ thereby opening the door to largescale extra dimensions (LSXD) tantamount to the regime of the unified field and thus awareness. The methodology surmounts the quantum uncertainty principle in a manner violating Quantum Electrodynamics, (QED), a cornerstone of modern theoretical physics, by spectrographic analysis of newly theorized Tight-Bound State (TBS) Bohr orbits in ‘continuous-state’ transition frequencies of atomic hydrogen. If one wonders why QED violation in the spectra of atomic hydrogen relates to solving the mind-body (observer) problem; consider this a 1st wrench in a forthcoming tool box of Unified Field Mechanics, UF that will soon enough in retrospect cause the current tools of Classical and Quantum Mechanics to appear as stone axes. Max Planck is credited as the founder of quantum mechanics with his 1900 quantum hypothesis that energy is radiated and absorbed discretely by the formulation, E = hv. Empirically implementing this next paradigm shift utilizing parameters of the long sought associated ‘new physics’ of the 3rd regime (classical-quantum- unified) allows access to LSXD of space; thus pragmatically opening the domain of mental action for the 1st time in history. This rendering constitutes a massive paradigm shift to Unified Field Theory creating a challenge for both the writer and the reader! (shrink)

G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) has commonly been seen as Europe’s leading philosopher since Kant. His influence extended across the globe down to the Second World War – not least through his dissident disciple, Karl Marx. Since then, despite intermittent revivals, his importance has tended to be eclipsed by a rising tide of anti-modernist polemic, extending from Heidegger to postmodernism. Central to Hegel’s political thought was his view of the French Revolution. But notwithstanding its pivotal role in the development of (...) his ideas, his reaction to that event has been systematically misconstrued. In presenting a more faithful account of Hegel’s interpretation of his own era, the argument presented here places his response to contemporary developments in the context of a series of World Revolutions which framed the meaning of his age. This approach serves to illustrate the unique combination of historical and philosophical reasoning on which Hegel’s thought depended. In the process, reconstructing his arguments raises challenging questions about the applicability of bygone political ideas to later historical periods. (shrink)

Space-time intervals are the fundamental components of conscious experience, gravity, and a Theory of Everything. Space-time intervals are relationships that arise naturally between events. They have a general covariance (independence of coordinate systems, scale invariance), a physical constancy, that encompasses all frames of reference. There are three basic types of space-time intervals (light-like, time-like, space-like) which interact to create space-time and its properties. Human conscious experience is a four-dimensional space-time continuum created through the processing of space-time intervals by the brain; (...) space-time intervals are the source of conscious experience (observed physical reality). Human conscious experience is modeled by Einstein’s special theory of relativity, a theory designed specifically from the general covariance of space-time intervals (for inertial frames of reference). General relativity is our most accurate description of gravity. In general relativity, the general covariance of space-time intervals is extended to all frames of reference (inertial and non-inertial), including gravitational reference frames; space-time intervals are the source of gravity in general relativity. The general covariance of space-time intervals is further extended to quantum mechanics; space-time intervals are the source of quantum gravity. The general covariance of space-time intervals seamlessly merges general relativity with quantum field theory (the two grand theories of the universe). Space-time intervals consequently are the basis of a Theory of Everything (a single all-encompassing coherent theoretical framework of physics that fully explains and links together all physical aspects of the universe). This theoretical framework encompasses our observed physical reality (conscious experience) as well; space-time intervals link observed physical reality to actual physical reality. This provides an accurate and reliable match between observed physical reality and the physical universe by which we can carry on our activity. The Minkowski metric, which defines generally covariant space-time intervals, may be considered an axiom (premise, postulate) for the Theory of Everything. (shrink)

How do brains create all our different colors, pains, and other conscious qualities? These various qualia are the most essential aspects of consciousness. Yet standard neuroscience (primarily based on synaptic information processing) has not found the synaptic-firing codes, sometimes described as the “spike code,” to account for how these qualia arise and how they unite to form complex perceptions, emotions, et cetera. Nor is it clear how to get from these abstract codes to the qualia we experience. But electromagnetic (...) class='Hi'>field (versus synaptic) approaches to how qualia arise have been offered in recent years by Pockett, McFadden, Jones, Bond, Ward and Guevera, Keppler and Shani, Hunt and Schooler, et cetera. These EM-field approaches show promise in offering more viable accounts of qualia. Yet, until now, they have not been evaluated together. We review various EM field theories of qualia, highlight their strengths and weaknesses, and contrast these theories with standard neuroscience approaches. -/- . (shrink)

Where is consciousness? Neurobiological theories of consciousness look primarily to synaptic firing and “spike codes” as the physical substrate of consciousness, although the specific mechanisms of consciousness remain unknown. Synaptic firing results from electrochemical processes in neuron axons and dendrites. All neurons also produce electromagnetic (EM) fields due to various mechanisms, including the electric potential created by transmembrane ion flows, known as “local field potentials,” but there are also more meso-scale and macro-scale EM fields present in the brain. The (...) functional role of these EM fields has long been a source of debate. We suggest that these fields, in both their local and global forms, may be the primary seat of consciousness, working as a gestalt with synaptic firing and other aspects of neuroanatomy to produce the marvelous complexity of minds. We call this assertion the “electromagnetic field hypothesis.” The neuroanatomy of the brain produces the local and global EM fields but these fields are not identical with the anatomy of the brain. These fields are produced by, but not identical with, the brain, in the same manner that twigs and leaves are produced by a tree’s branches and trunk but are not the same as the branches and trunk. As such, the EM fields represent the more granular, both spatially and temporally, aspects of the brain’s structure and functioning than the neuroanatomy of the brain. The brain’s various EM fields seem to be more sensitive to small changes than the neuroanatomy of the brain. We discuss issues with the spike code approach as well as the various lines of evidence supporting our argument that the brain’s EM fields may be the primary seat of consciousness. This evidence (which occupies most of the paper) suggests that oscillating neural EM fields may make firing in neural circuits oscillate, and these oscillating circuits. may help unify and guide conscious cognition. (shrink)

Recalling Thomas Nagel’s discussion concerning the difficulties associated with developing a scientific explanation for the nature of experience, Nagel states that current reductionist attempts fail by filtering out any basis for consciousness and thus become meaningless since they are logically compatible with its absence. In this article we call into question the fundamental philosophy of the mind-brain identity hypothesis of Cognitive Theory: ‘What processes in the brain give rise to awareness?’ and the associated search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCC). (...) The proper scientific manner of posing the query should simply be ‘What processes give rise to awareness?’. We begin to formalize the Eccles psychon and summarize one of fourteen empirical protocols to test this putative model. This requires a new science of Unified Field, UF Mechanics, entailing in terms of our current stage of development operationally completed forms of quantum theory, gravitation and cosmology arising from a unique derivation of the M-Theory (string theoretic) vacuum. Until now the quest for psychophysical bridging has typically been in the arena between brain and quantum geometry; and many have wondered if contemporary science is sufficient for the task. Nagel further asks ‘what would be left if one removed the viewpoint of the subjective observer’ and then suggests ‘that the remaining properties would be the physical processes themselves or states intrinsic to the experience of awareness’. We examine a new theoretical framework for introducing and experimentally testing the underlying physical cosmology of these noetic parameters. (shrink)

This physics note entails a summary of an extended form of Eccles-Cartesian Interactive Dualism mind-body-multiverse paradigm called Noetic Field Theory: The Quantization of Mind (NFT), distinguished as a paradigm because it is comprehensive and empirically testable. NFT posits not only that the brain is not the seat of awareness but also that neither classical nor quantum mechanics are sufficient to describe mind as the required regime entails the new physics associated with Unified Field, UF Mechanics. This means that (...) the brain is merely a transducer (form of quantum computer) mediating mentation, sensory data and metabolic function. The so-called ‘Hard Problem’ of cognitive science arises as a category error in philosophy of mind, i.e. an incorrect posit of the question “what processes in the brain give rise to awareness” which instead should simply be queried “what processes give rise to awareness”. In the history of science whenever a hard problem has arisen it has later been shown that the underlying principles had not been understood. NFT posits these underlying principles in a comprehensive empirically testable manner solving the ancient mind-body problem in a manner that enables breaking the 1st person 3rd person barrier able to explain Psi-phenomena. The premise is that the mind-body is a naturally occurring form of ‘conscious quantum computer’ (QC), not that the QC is conscious but that it is modelled after those principles. Such QC technologies could lead to routine telepathic effect devices. (shrink)

In the 1920s, David Hilbert proposed a research program with the aim of providing mathematics with a secure foundation. This was to be accomplished by first formalizing logic and mathematics in their entirety, and then showing---using only so-called finitistic principles---that these formalizations are free of contradictions. ;In the area of logic, the Hilbert school accomplished major advances both in introducing new systems of logic, and in developing central metalogical notions, such as completeness and decidability. The analysis of unpublished material presented (...) in Chapter 2 shows that a completeness proof for propositional logic was found by Hilbert and his assistant Paul Bernays already in 1917--18, and that Bernays's contribution was much greater than is commonly acknowledged. Aside from logic, the main technical contribution of Hilbert's Program are the development of formal mathematical theories and proof-theoretical investigations thereof, in particular, consistency proofs. In this respect Wilhelm Ackermann's 1924 dissertation is a milestone both in the development of the Program and in proof theory in general. Ackermann gives a consistency proof for a second-order version of primitive recursive arithmetic which, surprisingly, explicitly uses a finitistic version of transfinite induction up to www . He also gave a faulty consistency proof for a system of second-order arithmetic based on Hilbert's &egr;-substitution method. Detailed analyses of both proofs in Chapter 3 shed light on the development of finitism and proof theory in the 1920s as practiced in Hilbert's school. ;In a series of papers, Charles Parsons has attempted to map out a notion of mathematical intuition which he also brings to bear on Hilbert's finitism. According to him, mathematical intuition fails to be able to underwrite the kind of intuitive knowledge Hilbert thought was attainable by the finitist. It is argued in Chapter 4 that the extent of finitistic knowledge which intuition can provide is broader than Parsons supposes. According to another influential analysis of finitism due to W. W. Tait, finitist reasoning coincides with primitive recursive reasoning. The acceptance of non-primitive recursive methods in Ackermann's dissertation presented in Chapter 3, together with additional textual evidence presented in Chapter 4, shows that this identification is untenable as far as Hilbert's conception of finitism is concerned. Tait's conception, however, differs from Hilbert's in important respects, yet it is also open to criticisms leading to the conclusion that finitism encompasses more than just primitive recursive reasoning. (shrink)

This paper presents the first bibliometric mapping analysis of the field of computer and information ethics (C&IE). It provides a map of the relations between 400 key terms in the field. This term map can be used to get an overview of concepts and topics in the field and to identify relations between information and communication technology concepts on the one hand and ethical concepts on the other hand. To produce the term map, a data set of (...) over thousand articles published in leading journals and conference proceedings in the C&IE field was constructed. With the help of various computer algorithms, key terms were identified in the titles and abstracts of the articles and co-occurrence frequencies of these key terms were calculated. Based on the co-occurrence frequencies, the term map was constructed. This was done using a computer program called VOSviewer. The term map provides a visual representation of the C&IE field and, more specifically, of the organization of the field around three main concepts, namely privacy, ethics, and the Internet. (shrink)

This short commentary discusses the importance of space-time intervals in scientific study. Space-time intervals underlie special relativity, general relativity, and quantum field theory. In doing so, space-time intervals underlie human conscious experience, gravity, and a theory of everything. Space-time intervals also explain many puzzling scientific phenomena: quantum phenomena, dark matter, dark energy, the origin and evolution of the universe, and the life force. The importance of space-time intervals cannot be overestimated. Two articles published in Neuroquantology explain how all this (...) was established from empirical evidence and theory. (shrink)

Why is gauge symmetry so important in modern physics, given that one must eliminate it when interpreting what the theory represents? In this paper we discuss the sense in which gauge symmetry can be fruitfully applied to constrain the space of possible dynamical models in such a way that forces and charges are appropriately coupled. We review the most well-known application of this kind, known as the 'gauge argument' or 'gauge principle', discuss its difficulties, and then reconstruct the gauge argument (...) as a valid theorem in quantum theory. We then present what we take to be a better and more general gauge argument, based on Noether's second theorem in classical Lagrangian field theory, and argue that this provides a more appropriate framework for understanding how gauge symmetry helps to constrain the dynamics of physical theories. (shrink)

Evidence that minds are neural electromagnetic fields comes from research into how separate brain activities bind to form unified percepts and unified minds. Explanations of binding using synchrony, attention, and convergence are all problematic. But the unity of EM fields explains binding without these problems. These unified fields neatly explain correlations and divergences between synchrony, attention, convergence, and unified minds. The simplest explanation for the unity of both minds and fields is that minds are fields. Treating minds as the fields' (...) underlying, intrinsic nature has the further virtue of avoiding mind-body problems. There's also rising evidence that EM fields interact with brains. McFadden argues here that fields help shift the focus of attention by initiating synchrony in different neural networks, which boosts their own fields and thereby binds their activity. This evidence that minds are fields that bind and guide brain activities supports free will over epiphenomenalism and supervenience. (shrink)

Difference and Repetition might be said to have brought about a Deleuzian Revolution in philosophy comparable to Kant’s Copernican Revolution. Kant had denounced the three great terminal points of traditional metaphysics – self, world and God – as transcendent illusions, and Deleuze pushes Kant’s revolution to its limit by positing a transcendental field that excludes the coherence of the self, world and God in favour of an immanent and differential plane of impersonal individuations and pre-individual singularities. In the process, (...) he introduces numerous conceptual innovations into philosophy: the becoming of concepts; a transformation of the form of the question; an insistence that philosophy must start in the middle; an attempt to think in terms of multiplicities; the development of a new logic and a new metaphysics based on a concept of difference; a new conception of space as intensive rather than extensive; a conception of time as a pure and empty form; and an understanding of philosophy as a system in heterogenesis – that is, a system that entails a perpetual genesis of the heterogeneous, an incessant production of the new. -/- Keywords: concepts, becoming, multiplicity, singularity, the middle [au milieu], difference, intensity, time, system, the new. (shrink)

Delineating the framework for a fundamental model of long-range coherence in biological systems is said to rely on principles beyond parameters addressed by current physical science. Just as phenomena of quantum mechanics lay beyond tools of classical Newtonian mechanics we must now enter a 3rd regime of unified field, UF mechanics. In this paper we present a battery of nine empirical protocols for manipulating long-range coherence in complex self-organized living systems (SOLS) in a manner surmounting the Copenhagen Interpretation of (...) quantum uncertainty (space-quantization) thereby allowing empirical access to underlying coherent biophysical principles driving self-organization. Interestingly, while the UF is not indicative of a 5th fundamental force in the usual phenomenal sense of quantal transfer during field interactions; it does however provide an inherent ‘force of coherence’ in an energyless ontological sense by a process called ‘topological switching’ of higher dimensional (HD) brane dynamics. It is this putative inherent property that produces long-range coherence and leads to the possibility of its direct experimental mediation. (shrink)

General Relativity’s Schwarzschild solution describes a spherically symmetric gravitational field as an utterly static thing. The Space Generation Model describes it as an absolutely moving thing. The light propagation time-delay experiment of Shapiro-Reasenberg [1] and the falling atomic clock experiment of Vessot-Levine [2] provide the ideal context for illustrating how, though the respective world views implied by these models are radically di fferent, they make nearly the same prediction for the results of these experiments.

Neuroscience hasn’t shown how quite similar sensory circuits encode quite different colors and other qualia, nor how the unified pictorial form of images is encoded, nor how these codes yield conscious images. Neuroscience’s fixation here on cortical codes may be the culprit. Treating conscious images partly as retinal substances may avoid these problems. The evidence for conscious retinal images is that (a) the cortical codes for images are quite problematic, (b) injecting retinas with certain genes turns dichromats into trichromats without (...) cortical help, (c) retinas can discern colors by themselves without cortex, (d) retinal distortions appear in images but cortical distortions don’t, (e) retinal detectors support finely detailed colors, but V4 detectors don’t, due to their big receptive fields, (f) retinal activity has pictorial form, but viable cortical codes for pictorial form don’t exist. So, the colors and unified pictorial form of images arguably arise mainly across arrays of retinal detectors—not from abstract cortical codes. Images may be hidden in retinal activity beyond what EEGs show of it (cf. Strawson’s monism). Also, cortex refines these retinal images but cortical impairment (anesthesia, lesions, etc.) blocks awareness of them, for they’re no longer accessible to the mind’s subject-centered consciousness, resident in cortex. This proposal is largely testable and based in recent evidence. It avoids neuroscience’s elusive, problematic coded images and enigmatic explanations of how they become conscious. (shrink)

The study of teleology is challenging in many ways, but there is a particular challenge that makes matters worse, distorting the conceptual space that has set the terms of debate. And that is the tendency to think about teleology in terms of certain long-established dichotomies. In this paper, we examine four such dichotomies prevalent in the literature on teleology, the notions that: 1) Teleological explanations are opposed to mechanistic explanations; 2) teleology must arise from processes operating either internal to an (...) organism or external to it; 3) systems are either alive and teleological, or nonliving and not teleological; 4) humans are teleological, on account of our ability to intend, seek, prefer, etc., while other systems without these capacities are not. Here, we use our own view of goal directedness, field theory, to show for each dichotomy that there is an alternative, a view of teleology that either violates these dichotomies or demands revision of them. What this reveals is not only the dangers of dichotomous thinking, but a widespread lack of clarity about what teleology is. (shrink)

The notion of linguistic geometry is defined in this book. It is pertinent to keep in the record that linguistic geometry differs from classical geometry. Many basic or fundamental concepts and notions of classical geometry are not true or extendable in the case of linguistic geometry. Hence, for simple illustration, facts like two distinct points in classical geometry always define a line passing through them; this is generally not true in linguistic geometry. Suppose we have two linguistic points as tall (...) and light we cannot connect them, or technically, there is no line between them. However, let's take, for instance, two linguistic points, tall and very short, associated with the linguistic variable height of a person. We have a directed line joining from the linguistic point very short to the linguistic point tall. In this case, it is important to note that the direction is essential when the linguistic variable is a person's height. The other way line, from tall to very short, has no meaning. So in linguistic geometry, in general, we may not have a linguistic line; granted, we have a line, but we may not have it in both directions; the line may be directed. The linguistic distance is very far. So, the linguistic line directed or otherwise exists if and only if they are comparable. Hence the very concept of extending the line infinitely does not exist. Likewise, we cannot say as in classical geometry; three noncollinear points determine the plane in linguistic geometry. Further, we do not have the notion of the linguistic area of well-defined figures like a triangle, quadrilateral or any polygon as in the case of classical geometry. The best part of linguistic geometry is that we can define the new notion of linguistic social information geometric networks analogous to social information networks. This will be a boon to non-mathematics researchers in socio-sciences in other fields where natural languages can replace mathematics. (shrink)

In this book, the authors introduce the notion of Super linear algebra and super vector spaces using the definition of super matrices defined by Horst (1963). Many theorems on super linear algebra and its properties are proved. Some theorems are left as exercises for the reader. These new class of super linear algebras which can be thought of as a set of linear algebras, following a stipulated condition, will find applications in several fields using computers. The authors feel that such (...) a paradigm shift is essential in this computerized world. (shrink)

This study investigates all available literature related to critical thinking in business education in a survey of publications in the field produced from 1990-2019. It conducts a thematic analysis of 787 articles found in Web of Science and Google Scholar, including a specific focus on 55 highly-cited articles. The aim is to investigate the importance of critical thinking in business education, how it is conceptualised in business education research, the business contexts in which critical thinking is situated, and the (...) key and more marginal themes related to critical thinking outlined in the business and business education literature. The paper outlines six key areas and topics associated with those areas. It suggests future directions for further scholarly work in the area of critical thinking in business education. (shrink)

Teleology has a complicated history in the biological sciences. Some have argued that Darwin’s theory has allowed biology to purge itself of teleological explanations. Others have been content to retain teleology and to treat it as metaphorical, or have sought to replace it with less problematic notions like teleonomy. And still others have tried to naturalize it in a way that distances it from the vitalism of the nineteenth century, focusing on the role that function plays in teleological explanation. No (...) consensus has seemed possible in this debate. This paper takes a different approach. It argues that teleology is a perfectly acceptable scientific notion, but that the debate took an unfortunate misstep some 2300 years ago, one that has confused things ever since. The misstep comes in the beginning of Aristotle’s Physics when a distinction is made between two types of teleological explanation. One type pertains to artifacts while the other pertains to entities in nature. For Aristotle, artifacts are guided by something external to themselves, human intentions, while natural entities are guided by an internal nature. We aim to show that there is, in fact, only one type of legitimate teleological explanation, what Aristotle would have considered a variant of an artifact model, where entities are guided by external fields. We begin with an analysis of the differences between the two types of explanation. We then examine some evidence in Aristotle’s biological works suggesting that on account of his natural-artifactual distinction, he encountered difficulties in trying to provide teleological accounts of spontaneous generation. And we show that it is possible to resolve these difficulties with a more robust version of an artifact model of teleology, in other words, with an externalist teleology. This is McShea’s model, in which goal-directed entities are guided by a nested series of upper-level fields. To explain teleological behavior, this account invokes only external physical forces rather than mysterious internal natures. We then consider how field theory differs from other efforts to naturalize teleology in biology. And finally, we show how the account enables us to grapple with certain difficult cases – genes and intentions – where, even in biology today, the temptation to posit internal natures remains strong. (shrink)

Przed skomentowaniem książki, oferuję uwagi na temat Wittgenstein i Searle i logicznej struktury racjonalności. Eseje tutaj są w większości już opublikowane w ciągu ostatniej dekady (choć niektóre zostały zaktualizowane), wraz z jednym niepublikowanym elementem, i nic tutaj nie będzie zaskoczeniem dla tych, którzy nadążyli za jego pracą. Podobnie jak W, jest uważany za najlepszego filozofa standupu swoich czasów, a jego twórczość pisemna jest solidna jak skała i przełomowa w całym. Jednak jego brak podjęcia później W wystarczająco poważnie prowadzi do pewnych (...) błędów i zamieszania. Tylko kilka przykładów: na p7 dwukrotnie zauważa, że nasza pewność co do podstawowych faktów wynika z przytłaczającej wagi rozumu na poparcie naszych roszczeń, ale W pokazał definitywnie w "Na pewności", że nie ma możliwości wątpliwości co do prawdziwej tylko aksjomatycznej struktury naszego systemu 1 postrzegania, wspomnień i myśli, ponieważ sam w sobie jest podstawą do osądu i nie może być osądzony. W pierwszym zdaniu na p8 mówi nam, że pewność jest re prostu, ale tego rodzaju "pewność", którą moglibyśmy nazwać Certainty2, jest wynikiem rozszerzenia naszej aksjomatycznej i niepodróżnej pewności (Pewność1) poprzez doświadczenie i jest zupełnie inna, ponieważ jest propositional (prawda lub fałsz). Jest to oczywiście klasyczny przykład "walki z urzekaniem naszej inteligencji przez język", którą W wielokrotnie demonstrował. Jedno słowo- dwa (lub wiele) różnych zastosowań. Jego ostatni rozdział "Jedność propozycji" (wcześniej niepublikowane) również skorzystają znacznie z czytania W "Na pewność" lub dwóch książek DMS na OC (patrz moje recenzje), ponieważ jasno różnica między prawdziwymi tylko zdania opisujące S1 i prawdziwe lub fałszywe propozycje opisujące S2. To uderza mnie jako znacznie lepsze podejście do S biorąc S1 postrzegania jako propositional ponieważ tylko się T lub F po raz zaczyna myśleć o nich w S2. Jednak jego punkt, że propozycje pozwalają na oświadczenia rzeczywistej lub potencjalnej prawdy i fałszu, przeszłości i przyszłości i fantazji, a tym samym stanowić ogromny postęp w stosunku do społeczeństwa pre lub protolinguistic, jest przekonujący. Jak mówi: "Propozycja jest w ogóle czymś, co może określić warunek satysfakcji... i warunek satysfakcji... jest to, że tak i tak jest." Lub, trzeba dodać, że może być lub może być lub może być wyobrażane, że tak jest. -/- Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, PNC jest dobrym podsumowaniem wielu znaczących postępów w Wittgenstein wynikających z pół wieku pracy S, ale moim zdaniem, W nadal jest niezrównany, gdy uchwycić, co mówi. Idealnie, powinny być czytane razem: Searle dla jasnej prozy spójne i uogólnienia, zilustrowane perspicacious przykłady W i genialny aforyzmów. Gdybym był dużo młodszy, napisałbym książkę, która właśnie to robi. -/- Ci, którzy chcą kompleksowych, aktualnych ram dla ludzkich zachowań z nowoczesnego widoku dwóch systems, mogą zapoznać sięz moją książką "Logiczna struktura filozofii, psychologii, mind ijęzyka w Ludwig wittgenstein i John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Osoby zainteresowane bardziej moimi pismami mogą zobaczyć "Talking Monkeys - Filozofia, Psychologia, Nauka, Religia i Polityka na Skazanej Planecie - Artykuły i recenzje 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) i Suicidal Utopian Urojenia w 21wieku 4th th ed (2019) i inne. (shrink)

The ethical issues raised by cybersecurity practices and technologies are of critical importance. However, there is disagreement about what is the best ethical framework for understanding those issues. In this paper we seek to address this shortcoming through the introduction of a principlist ethical framework for cybersecurity that builds on existing work in adjacent fields of applied ethics, bioethics, and AI ethics. By redeploying the AI4People framework, we develop a domain-relevant specification of five ethical principles in cybersecurity: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, (...) justice, and explicability. We then illustrate the advantages of this principlist framework by examining the ethical issues raised by four common cybersecurity contexts: penetration testing, distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), ransomware, and system administration. These case analyses demonstrate the utility of this principlist framework as a basis for understanding cybersecurity ethics and for cultivating the ethical expertise and ethical sensitivity of cybersecurity professionals and other stakeholders. (shrink)

This chapter describes the potential far‐reaching consequences of contemplative higher education for the fields of science and medicine.

This essay moves along broad lines from molecular biology to evolutionary biology and ecology to theology. Its objectives are to: 1) present some recent scientific findings in the emerging field of epigenetics that indicate that it is “the genome in context,” not genes per se, that are important in biological development and evolution; 2) show that this weakens the gene-centric neo-Darwinist explanation of evolution which, in fact, shares a certain preformationist orientation with intelligent design theory; 3) argue that the (...) evidence against a gene-centric view in no way negates Darwin’s central idea of “descent with modification”; 4) argue that an embrace of the evolutionary story, with all of its contingency and apparent lack of directionality, is not only consistent with Christianity, but actually resonates with the notion of the self-emptying love of God in Jesus Christ; and finally 5) suggest that we are called through an ecological imperative to embrace our evolutionary story, to listen to our “genetic coding,” and to reclaim our grounding as a species in the natural world. Corrigendum (published in later issue of journal): There was an error in the paragraph describing the mode of action of the small temporally-expressed RNAs (stRNAs) lin-4 and let-7 from Caenorhabditis elegans. Instead of reading "These two stRNAs act by binding to the tails of their target messenger RNAs (mRNAs); this results in destruction of the target and an overall drop in the level of production of protein from agouti mRNA" [note that agouti mRNA is not a target of these stRNAs], the sentence should have read, "These two stRNAs act by binding to the tails of target messenger RNAs (mRNAs); this leads to inhibition of translation of the mRNAs into protein and a consequent drop in the levels of the corresponding target protein.". (shrink)

The Philosophy of Social Science: A Contemporary Introduction examines the perennial questions of philosophy by engaging with the empirical study of society. The book offers a comprehensive overview of debates in the field, with special attention to questions arising from new research programs in the social sciences. The text uses detailed examples of social scientific research to motivate and illustrate the philosophical discussion. Topics include the relationship of social policy to social science, interpretive research, action explanation, game theory, social (...) scientific accounts of norms, joint intentionality, reductionism, causal modeling, case study research, and experimentation. (shrink)

Harmonia Spoleczna -- Social Harmony. In this book, I set out to prove that once we correctly identify human nature and organize our world according to the principle of cooperation, we can arrive at a world of social harmony. The current disharmony in the world, which can be observed especially in the field of politics and economics, is largely related to the erroneous modern Western philosophical assertions identifying the human being with an individual moved by desires and the will (...) to power, and the phenomenon of life with an endless conflict. An additional influence is provided by the flawed postmodernist conceptions of culture and family. These errors have enormous implications with regard to how we picture the world in which we live. I want to show that cooperation is an integral part of human nature, and that the society organized according to the requirements of nature is a truly happy society. Principles of happy society and of good governance are introduced. (shrink)

The field of iterated belief change has focused mainly on revision, with the other main operator of AGM belief change theory, i.e. contraction, receiving relatively little attention. In this paper we extend the Harper Identity from single-step change to define iterated contraction in terms of iterated revision. Specifically, just as the Harper Identity provides a recipe for defining the belief set resulting from contracting A in terms of (i) the initial belief set and (ii) the belief set resulting from (...) revision by ¬A, we look at ways to define the plausibility ordering over worlds resulting from contracting A in terms of (iii) the initial plausibility ordering, and (iv) the plausibility ordering resulting from revision by ¬A. After noting that the most straightforward such extension leads to a trivialisation of the space of permissible orderings, we provide a family of operators for combining plausibility orderings that avoid such a result. These operators are characterised in our domain of interest by a pair of intuitively compelling properties, which turn out to enable the derivation of a number of iterated contraction postulates from postulates for iterated revision. We finish by observing that a salient member of this family allows for the derivation of counterparts for contraction of some well known iterated revision operators, as well as for defining new iterated contraction operators. (shrink)

Tarihte herhalde çok az soru Tanrı’nın varlığı sorusu kadar sık sorulmuş, çok yanıtlanmış ve verilen birbirinden farklı onca yanıta rağmen kesin bir sonuca ulaştırılamayıp tartışılmaya devam etmiştir. Yine de geçmişe dönüp baktığımızda bu soruya verilen farklı yanıtların farklı uygarlıkların inşa edilmesine, bazılarının yıkılmasına, acımasız çatışmalara ve her şeye rağmen kucaklaşmalara da vesile olduğunu görüyoruz. Tanrı var mı? Varsa onu nasıl bilebiliriz? Tanrı yoksa her şey mubah mı? İnsan aklı ilahi olanı kavrayabilir mi? Tanrı’nın varlığı ahlaklı olmanın şartı mı? Evren akıllı (...) bir tasarımcının imzasını taşıyor mu? Bu kitapta felsefeci William David Beck, bu sorulara tarihte verilen yanıtları ve bu konudaki tartışmaları ele alarak meselenin genel ve tarihsel bir tablosunu bize sunuyor. Platon, Aristoteles, Marcus Aurelius gibi Eski Yunan ve Roma düşünürlerinden Anselmus, Thomas Aquinas, Augustinus ve Yahudi-Hıristiyan geleneğine, Doğu’nun bilgelerine, İbni Rüşd, Fârâbî ve Gazzâlî gibi İslam düşünürlerinden Alvin Plantinga, Graham Oppy, Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Max Tegmark gibi Batılı modern ilahiyatçılara, bilim insanlarına ve Yeni Ateizm hareketine kadar uzanan bir çizgide “Tanrı var mı?” sorusuna verilen çeşitli yanıtları ve bu yanıtlara sunulan akılcı gerekçeleri ortaya koyarak soruya felsefece bir yanıt vermenin nasıl bir iş olduğunu da gösteriyor. (shrink)

사회 세계 (MSW)를 만들기 에 자세히 언급하기 전에 m나는 먼저 철학 (설명 심리학)과 Searle (S)와 비트 겐슈타인 (W)의 작품에서 예시로 현대 심리학 연구와의 관계에 대한 몇 가지 의견을 제공 할 것입니다, 나는 이것이 행동에 Searle 또는 어떤 해설자를 배치하는 가장 좋은 방법이라고 생각하기 때문에, 적절한 관점에서. 그것은 크게 설명 심리학의이 두 천재에 의해 PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW 및 기타 책의 내 리뷰를 볼 도움이 될 것입니다. S는 TLP의 메커니즘으로 W의 선견지명 진술과 그의 후기 작업에서 그의 파괴에 대한 언급을하지 않습니다. (...) W, S는 행동의 이러한 기계적 견해의 주요 해체자가되었다, 그리고 가장 중요한 설명 심리학자 (철학자), 하지만 W가 그를 완전히 예상하고, 크게, 다른 사람을 수행 (하지만 W, 튜링과 AI에 프라우드 풋과 코플랜드의 많은 논문과 책을 참조하십시오). S의 작품은 W보다 훨씬 쉽게 따라할 수 있으며, 일부 전문 용어가 있지만 올바른 방향으로 접근하면 대부분 극적으로 분명합니다. 자세한 내용은 W S 및 기타 책에 대한 내 리뷰를 참조하십시오. 전반적으로, MSW는 작업의 S의 반세기에서 발생하는 Wittgenstein을 통해 많은 실질적인 발전의 좋은 요약이지만, 내 보기에, W는 여전히 그가 말하는 것을 파악하면 기본 심리학에 대한 타의 추종을 불허합니다 (내 리뷰 참조). 이상적으로, 그들은 함께 읽어야한다 : S1 / S2의 운영W의 기발한 예와 함께 설명 S2 / S3의 운영에 명확한 일관된 산문과 일반화에 대한 Searle, 그의 화려한 격언. 제가 훨씬 어렸을 때, 저는 그 일을 하는 책을 쓰곤 했습니다. 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

Research integrating cognitive abilities and personality has focused on the role of personality traits. We propose a theory on the role of intraindividual variability of personality states (hereafter state variability) on perspective taking, in particular, the ability to infer other peoples’ mental states. First, we review the relevant research on personality psychology and social cognition. Second, we propose two complementary routes by which state variability relates to anchoring and adjustment in perspective taking. The first route, termed ego-dispersion, suggests that an (...) increased state variability decreases egocentric bias, which reduces anchoring. The second route, termed perspective-pooling, suggests that an increased state variability facilitates efficient adjustment. We also discuss how our theory can be investigated empirically. The theory is rooted in an ecological interpretation of personality and social cognition, and flags new ways for integrating these fields of research. (shrink)

Seminal work intended to found a new field of integrative Noetic Science is summarized. Until now the philosophy of Biological Mechanism has ruled medicine and psychology. Penrose claims, AA scientific world-view which does not profoundly come to terms with the problem of conscious mind can have no serious pretensions of completeness@. A noetic action principle synonymous with the historic concept of élan vital is introduced as the basis of a Continuous State Conscious Universe (CSCU). The least unit of CSCU (...) superspace defines Awareness as a fundamental physical quantity like charge in electrodynamics. This cosmological context reveals the origin of complexity in self-organized living-systems wherein the physical basis of qualia is formalized. The dynamics of this teleological action principle, mediated by a unitary noetic field pervading all biochemical species, optimizes the state of well-being through homeostasis and provides the fundamental basis for developing a Moral Psychology. (shrink)

Antes de comentar detalladamente sobre Haciendo lo Mundo Social (MSW) primero voy a ofrecer algunos comentarios sobre la filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como ejemplificado en las obras de Searle (S) y Wittgenstein (W), ya que siento que esta es la mejor manera de lugar Searle o cualquier comentarista sobre el comportamiento, en la perspectiva adecuada. Será de gran ayuda para ver mis comentarios de PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW y otros libros de estos (...) dos genios de la psicología descriptiva. S no hace ninguna referencia a la declaración de la mente presciente de W como mecanismo en TLP, y su destrucción de ella en su trabajo posterior. Desde W, S se ha convertido en el principal deconstructor de estas vistas mecánicas de la conducta, y el psicólogo descriptivo más importante (filósofo), pero no se da cuenta de cómo completamente W lo anticipó ni, en general, hacer otros (pero ver los muchos papeles y libros de Proudfoot y Copeland en W, Turing y AI). El trabajo de S es mucho más fácil de seguir que W, y aunque hay cierta jerga, es sobre todo espectacularmente claro si te acercas desde la dirección correcta. Vea mis reseñas de W S y otros libros para más detalles. En general, MSW es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable para la psicología básica una vez que entiendes lo que está diciendo (ver mis comentarios). Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa coherente y generalizaciones sobre la operación de S2/S3, ilustrada con los ejemplos perspicaces de W de la operación de S1/S2, y sus brillantes aforismos. Si yo fuera mucho más joven escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos systems punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje nn Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Antes de comentar sobre el libro, ofrezco comentarios sobre Wittgenstein y Searle y la estructura lógica de la racionalidad. Los ensayos aquí son en su mayoría ya publicados durante la última década (aunque algunos han sido actualizados), junto con un artículo inédito, y nada aquí vendrá como una sorpresa para aquellos que han mantenido su trabajo. Al igual que W, es considerado como el mejor filósofo de su tiempo y su obra escrita es sólida como una roca y pionera en (...) todo. Sin embargo, su fracaso para tomar la W más tarde lo suficientemente seriamente conduce a algunos errores y confusiones. Sólo algunos ejemplos: en P7, dos veces señala que nuestra certeza sobre los hechos básicos se debe al peso abrumador de la razón que respalda nuestras afirmaciones, pero W demostró definitivamente en ' on certidumbre ' que no hay posibilidad de dudar de la verdadera estructura axiomática de nuestro sistema 1 percepciones, memorias y pensamientos, ya que es en sí la base para el juicio y no puede ser juzgado. En la primera frase del P8 nos dice que la certeza es revisable, pero este tipo de ' certeza ', que podríamos llamar Certainty2, es el resultado de extender nuestra certeza axiomática y no revisable (Certainty1) a través de la experiencia y es completamente diferente, ya que es proposicional (verdadero o falso). Este es, por supuesto, un ejemplo clásico de la "batalla contra la hechizamiento de nuestra inteligencia por el lenguaje" que W demostró una y otra vez. Una palabra-dos (o muchos) usos distintos. Su último capítulo "la unidad de la Proposición" (anteriormente inédito) también se beneficiaría en gran medida de la lectura de W "en la certeza" o de los dos libros de DMS sobre OC (ver mis comentarios), ya que hacen claro la diferencia entre verdaderas sólo frases que describen S1 y verdadero o falso proposiciones que describen S2. Esto me parece un enfoque muy superior a S tomando percepciones S1 como proposicional ya que sólo se convierten en T o F después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Sin embargo, su punto de que las proposiciones permiten declaraciones de la verdad y la falsedad real o potencial, del pasado y del futuro y de la fantasía, y por lo tanto proporcionar un gran avance sobre la sociedad pre o protolingüística, es convincente. Como dice, "una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser el caso. En general, PNC es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable una vez que se comprende lo que está diciendo. Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa y generalizaciones coherentes, ilustradas con los ejemplos perspicaces de W y aforismos brillantes. Si yo fuera mucho más joven escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Horwich dá uma boa análise de Wittgenstein (W) e é um estudioso w líder, mas na minha opinião, todos eles estão aquém de uma apreciação plena, como eu explicar em comprimento nesta revisão e muitos outros. Se um não compreende W (e preferivelmente Searle também) então eu não ver como um poderia ter mais do que uma compreensão superficial da filosofia e do pensamento mais elevado da ordem e assim de todo o comportamento complexo (psychologia, sociologia, antropologia, história, literatura, sociedade (...) civil). Em poucas palavras, W demonstrou que quando você tem mostrado como uma sentença é usada no contexto de interesse, não há nada mais a dizer. Vou começar com algumas citações notáveis e, em seguida, dar o que eu acho que são as considerações mínimas necessárias para entender Wittgenstein, filosofia e comportamento humano. Primeiro pode-se notar que colocar "meta" na frente de qualquer palavra deve ser suspeito. W comentou, por exemplo, que a metamatemática é matemática como qualquer outra. A noção de que podemos pisar fora da filosofia (ou seja, a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) é em si uma profunda confusão. Outra irritação aqui (e ao longo da escrita acadêmica para as últimas 4 décadas) é o sexismo linguístico reverso constante de "ela" e "dela" e "ela" ou "ele/ela", etc, onde "eles" e "deles" e "eles" faria bem. Da mesma forma, o uso da palavra francesa ' repertório ', onde o repertório Inglês ' vai fazer muito bem. A maior deficiência é a falha completa (embora muito comum) para empregar o que eu vejo como a visão de dois sistemas extremamente poderoso e intuitivo de HOT e Searle ' s estructura que eu esboçou aqui. Isto é especialmente comovente no capítulo sobre o significado P111 et seq (especialmente nas notas de rodapé 2-7), onde nadamos em água muito enlameada, sem o quadro de automatizado verdadeiro apenas S1, proposicional mudança de caráter S2, cos etc. Um pode igualmente começ uma vista melhor do interno e do exterior lendo por exemplo, Johnston ou Budd (veja meus comentários). Horwich, no entanto, faz muitos comentários incisivos. Eu gostei especialmente de seu resumo da importação da postura antiteórica de W em p65. Ele precisa dar mais ênfase a "on certeza", recentemente o tema de muito esforço por Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva e outros e resumidos em meus artigos recentes. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)